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1,867,56,phi,eng,20170702,20170702,4,P.M.S. Hacker: Wittgenstein on Human Nature
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I think you might like this book – "The Great Philosophers: Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein" by Peter Hacker.
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Cover 
Dedication 
Title Page 
22,3,Introduction 
22,h,Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. He came to Britain to study aeronautical engineering at Manchester University in 1908.
34,h,After completing the Tractatus, Wittgenstein abandoned philosophy for a decade. In 1929
,,posthumous masterpiece: the Philosophical Investigations (1953). In it he presented a revolutionary conception of philosophy,
40,h,Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology undermined the Cartesian, empiricist and behaviourist traditions.
,d,human being – a psychophysical unity, not an embodied anima
47,s,While Cartesians and behaviourists represented behaviour as bare bodily movement, Wittgenstein emphasized that human behaviour is, and is experienced as being, suffused with meaning, thought, passion and will.
60,3,Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy 
60,p,According to Platonists, the aim of philosophy is the investigation of
,,Aristotelians thought of philosophy as continuous with the sciences, distinct from the special sciences primarily in its generality.
65,h,The British empiricists, by contrast, thought of philosophy as an investigation into the origins of our ideas, the extent and nature of human knowledge.
71,h,It was characteristic of Wittgenstein not to take sides in pre-existing philosophical debates,
78,h,‘One keeps forgetting to go right down to the foundations,’ he wrote. ‘One doesn’t put the question marks deep enough down’ (CV 62).
103,d,The task of philosophy is to resolve or dissolve philosophical problems by clarification of what makes sense.
117,h,Philosophical problems are symptoms of conceptual entanglement in the web of language.
167,h,Teaching philosophy involves the same immense difficulty as instructions in geography would have if the pupil brought with him a mass of false and falsely simplified ideas about the course and connections of rivers and mountains.
181,3,Mind, Body and Behaviour: The Power of a Philosophical Illusion 
186,h,person is an embodied anima, for while the body is destructible, the mind or soul is not.
207,h,Is it not absurd to suppose that all statements about voluntary human action, such as promising, paying a bill, speaking or writing, are analysable into descriptions of mental acts of volition and of consequent bodily movements?
214,h,the mind stands to the brain as the software of a computer stands to its hardware
,,Consciousness is compared with a self-scanning mechanism in the brain;
220,Wittgenstein was little concerned with the details of the philosophical systems of his predecessors. His preoccupation was with the roots of philosophical error,
228,h,The physical world is public, accessible to all by perception. The mental world is the world of subjective experience. It
236,h,the inner world are essentially private: ‘Nobody else has my pain.
244,h,Experiences are inalienable ‘private property’.
265,h,So one cannot have genuine knowledge of the inner life of others, as one does of one’s own.
272,3,Private Ownership of Experience
278,h,You say that you don’t wish to apply the phrase, ‘he has got my pain’ or ‘we both have the same pain’, and instead, perhaps you will apply such a phrase as ‘his pain is exactly like mine’.
297,h,If two people both have a sharp throbbing pain in their left eye, then they have the same pain – neither qualitatively nor numerically the same, just the same – and may well be suffering from the same disease.
330,3,Epistemic Privacy 
,h,someone else logically cannot have the same experience, and cannot ‘peer into the mind’ of another person. But
336,h,Surely we are aware of our inner states, are conscious of them.
409,h,A self-conscious being is not a creature who is conscious of his aches and pains, but rather one who is aware of his motives, knows
445,3,Descriptions and Expressions 
522,h,Language – I want to say – is a refinement, “in the beginning was the deed”’ (CV 31).
569,3,The Inner and the Outer: Knowledge of Others 
597,h,Witnessing the suffering of another is not acquisition of indirect knowledge, and the sufferer does not have direct knowledge – what he has is pain, not knowledge.
613,h,A similar misconception attends the thought that what we hear when listening to another talking are mere sounds, which our brain then interprets as meaningful speech. Joy, distress or amusement are not hidden behind the face that manifests them, but visible on it.
652,3,Minds, Bodies and Behaviour 
667,h,A robot which responds to verbal instructions does not hear, and when it malfunctions it is not deaf. A computer does not become conscious when it is turned on, nor does it fall asleep when turned off.
731,h,the brain gains its knowledge by a process analogous to the inductive reasoning of the classical scientific method. Neurons present arguments to the brain based on the specific features they detect, arguments on which the brain constructs its hypothesis of perception.
752,3,Can Machines Think? 
,h,Wittgenstein lived before the computer age. Nevertheless, he did reflect on these questions.
774,h,But does it not calculate? Not in the sense in which we do. The computer does not understand the results it types out, does not know what the symbols it displays mean, for it neither knows nor understands anything.
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803,3,Notes 
829,3,Abbreviations 
851,3,About the Author 
851,b,201707021226:+ 56
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